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Abstract 
Answers to the price and production range and minimum benchmark required for Nigeria’s 2015 budget, considering 
the short, medium and long-term breaks that could emanate from the recent conundrums, are provided. Following 
trend analyses, a pattern recognition procedure when series are known, GARCH modeling, and the confidence interval 
approach, it was found that the crude oil price benchmark for the country can be revised downward and the production 
benchmark can be revised upward to reduce the effect of geopolitics and upside risks amidst the prevailing challenges 
in the international market. The minimum benchmark varies according to the periods. Longer term necessitates rising 
oil production, which suggests that a longer duration of oil price falls,  lowers uncertainty surrounding it - as the 
expectation of rebound will set in, coupled with behavioral adjustments. The crude oil price (Brent) will be near US$40 
per barrel for the next 90 days. It is concluded that Nigeria should not be concerned about revising the benchmark of 
oil production volume downward and should also bear in mind that the crude oil price will stabilize for a longer period 
- i.e. three months at around US$40-$67 per barrel. This, however, accommodates raising volatility and an 
international supply glut. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The trend of a continuous fall in the oil price has been a linchpin debate in recent forums. The agitation for a 
reduction in production is necessitated owing to the collusive structure of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) – resulting in a decline in oil revenue for participating members. Although some members of OPEC 
have remained adamant in revising production downward to hold world market share and to increase revenue, this 
decries the microeconomic relationship binding OPEC, and further weakens the oil price.  
For an oil dependent nation - or put differently, a mono-cultural country – the oil-supply glut sounds unalike 
as it poses strong signal, to revenue generation and thriving economic activities. Nigeria’s fiscal revenue depends 
largely on revenue from oil. In 2013, 73.2% of Nigeria’s Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) came from oil revenue. 
The recent free-fall in the crude oil price internationally has begun to hurt the economy - such that sustaining national 
expenditure in the medium term is contentious. This free-fall in the crude oil price is not the first of its kind, and trend 
analysis has shown that it has happened in the past - specifically in the 1980s, and in late 2006 and 2008. Analysts 
have opined that the 2006 decline was a sign of the looming global crisis, while the 2008 free-fall was attributed to 
the harmful effect of the global financial crisis. Since 2008, the price had been on an upward trajectory in tandem with 
crude oil production. Recently, however, the crude oil price slid from US$112.27 in June 2014 to US$78.4 in 
November 2014, and further declined to US$59.5 in December 2014 – and has continued to fall. Experts believe that 
the recent price reduction will last for some time, and, in addition, OPEC members should attempt to reduce supply 
to eliminate a surplus. In an attempt to respond to this, Nigeria’s benchmark for the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework and Fiscal Strategy Paper (MTEF/FSP) has been on revised to accommodate the impact of the 
development. The country has also introduced some austerity measures to serve as fiscal buffers, in response to the 
reduced oil price. That said, one of the policy options available to OPEC to address the falling oil price is a reduction 
in quota (volume of products). The reasons for the urgent appraisal of these two variables (oil price and production) 
are: first, both variables are crucial elements in Nigeria’s benchmark of her budget; second, they determine the revenue 
base of the country, as 90% of the nation’s revenue comes from oil, and, finally, they significantly influence economic 
operations and overall activities in the country.   
Obadan (2003, 2014) and Ekpo (2014) examined the effect of a decline in the crude oil price on the budget and 
planning and economic performance, and are of the opinion that government should engage in productive borrowing 
if necessary. However,  none of these studies has been able to respond proactively to crude oil price and production 
bounds -  Notably, crude oil price and production benchmarks in the MTEF/FSP paper for 2015 budget was presented 
three times before the nation’s National Assembly and up till now there are no consensus regarding the appropriate 
benchmark for the two variables due to the increased volatility in oil production and free-fall nature of oil price - that 
will contain needed revenue, even though OPEC yields to the call of experts on cuts in production, or otherwise. Based 
on this, the paper attempts to answer the following research question: what price and production bounds should be set 
as a benchmark in the short, medium and long terms - that will consider developments in the international oil market 
and the possibility of OPEC not cutting supply and providing the needed revenue? The aim of the paper is to suggest 
optimal price and production levels that will enhance fiscal coordination – without distorting fiscal management of 
the economy. A policy relating to the crude oil price and production is suggested from the findings. The paper is 
arranged into five succinct sections. Section two addresses the previous empirical debate on the subject. Section three 
discusses materials and methods, section four presents and discusses the results, and section five presents the summary 
and conclusions.  
 
2. Oil effects and perspectives in the literature 
Many studies have adopted diverse theoretical explanations of the major reasons why oil is important, and more 
significantly, how its price changes influence its output and economic activities. Other empirical debates were mainly 
focused on explaining the relationship between oil and the macro-economy (Barsky & Kilian, 2004). Huntington 
(2005) focused more on the relationship between oil price-output movements and the business cycle and stated that 
the evolution of this debate started after 1973. Darby (1982) and Hamilton (1983) were among the first contributors 
to discuss the oil price. Darby (1982) is not content with the acumen that macroeconomic variables are the major 
factors that influence recessions in the United States. Hamilton, on the other hand, reported a significant connection 
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between fluctuations in the price of oil and the growth in real GDP.  
After Hamilton’s 1983 submission, studies employed a vector auto-regression (VAR) model to estimate the 
impulse response of selected economic variables to oil price changes. He deduced a causal relationship between oil 
price shocks and economic variables – although some countries had ambiguous results. Gisser and Goodwin (1986) 
introduced the growth rate of nominal crude oil price in St Louis type equations of four indicators of macroeconomic 
performance. In 1986, the global economy experienced an oil price collapse – however, the decline resulted in 
economic prosperity. This contradicts the positive-effect syndrome between oil price and economic performance. On 
average, studies abound on oil price and output movements and have established that an oil price rise has apparent 
inverse impacts. However, the effect of a decline in the price of oil not usually positive and may lead to slower 
economic growth. Mork (1989) validates Hamilton’s findings and further examines the effect of the oil price collapse 
in 1986. In this period, the oil price-quantity relationship seems not to hold. Based on this development, Mork tested 
the symmetry hypothesis on the United States data and considered real increases and decreases in oil price to have 
different coefficients in a regression specification, and real GDP was used as the regressand. He found that oil price 
increases were negative and highly statistically significant, while price decreases were positive, small in magnitude, 
and statistically insignificant. Mork, Olsen and Mysen (1994) extended their analyses to cover all countries. The 
results showed an inverse relationship between the growth in the economy and oil price increase except Norway. 
In a related study, Lee, Ni & Ratti (1995), affirmed that volatility in oil price movements caused a brake down 
in the United Stated macro-economic fluctuations and oil price shocks relationship. Hooker (1996) finds a strong 
relationship between oil prices and U.S. macroeconomic variables, and further reports that the oil price does not 
Granger-cause macroeconomic variables in the United States. The net oil price increase concept was developed by 
Hamilton in 1996 and it was employed on the U.S. economy using VAR model and it showed a significant connection 
between real GDP and the price of oil.  
Bernanke, Gentler and Watson (1997) opine that the economy downturns experienced by the United States 
might have been avoided if the increment in the in the interest rates following an oil price shock was not implemented 
by the Federal Reserve. A similar result was obtained by Barsky and Kilian (2004). Subsequent studies however 
refuted these claims (Brown & Yucel, 1999; Hamilton & Herrera, 2001). An inverse relationship between oil price 
and GDP of the G – 7 countries and Norway was reported by Jimenez and Rodriguez (2005). The consumer price 
indices, industrial production and oil price shock impact for some countries in Europe were reported by Cunado and 
Perez de Gracia (2003). 
 Huang, Huang and Peng (2005) examine the impact of oil price volatility on economic activity adopting  a 
multivariate threshold model. Kilian (2006) examined the effects of exogenous shocks to global oil production on the 
most industrialised countries. Salisu and Mobolaji’s (2013) model returns and volatility transmission of oil price and 
the US-Nigeria exchange rate. They find that the structural breaks in the model were in line with the period of Nigeria 
foreign exchange crisis and the global financial meltdown. Similarly, a bidirectional returns and spill-over 
transmission between oil and foreign exchange markets; the analysis was done using the VAR-GARCH modelling.  
Based on the literature, it is deduced that the effect of oil price and production movements (either increases or 
decreases) is costly on macroeconomic activities – especially GDP, industrial production, inflation and exchange rate. 
Hence, the recent free-fall in the oil price that has instigated a re-think on production strategy needs to be properly 
examined to mitigate its effect on macroeconomic activities in the short, medium and long term.    
3. Materials and methods 
Secondary data on crude oil production, price and OPEC production were sourced from the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Commission (NNPC) and OPEC statistical bulletins for various years. The methodologies adopted by the 
study are trend analyses, pattern recognition, and GARCH modelling. Trend analysis and pattern recognition are used 
to determine the behaviour of Nigeria’s crude oil production in the period of price outliers also in recognising the 
country’s production pattern during these periods. Having established the pattern, the GARCH model is employed to 
estimate term variance and volatility for both price and quantity.  We make use of the GARCH (1, 1) model for three 
reasons. First, it allows for a degree of volatility persistence in the series, which makes it more fashionable and most 
appropriate. Two, the ARCH model suffers from serial correlation which is taken care of in the GARCH (1, 1) model. 
Third, researchers have come to a consensus that the GARCH (1, 1) model appears to be the best after several Monte-
Carlo simulations. One month, three and six months ahead were used as short, medium and long-term price and 
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production benchmarks.  Table 1 below shows the descriptive statistics for crude oil price and production (COPP). 
There seems to be evidence of significant variations in the COPP trends, as is shown by the large difference between 
the minimum value of 44 mb/month and maximum value of 141.86 mb/month for production, and US$17.53 and 
US$136.03 for minimum and maximum values. When compared with the mean value of 83.31 mb/month for oil 
production, the difference is still large, also, a similar trend could be seen for oil price. These values are all supported 
by the standard deviation values of 21.39 and 33.36. Other properties observed for both crude oil price and production 
trends are reported in Table 1. The unconditional correlation indicates that crude oil production and price are highly 
positively related, with 87.3% degree of relationship. This implies that the pattern expected between crude oil 
production and price should be positive, on average.   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (Jan-2000 to Nov. 2014)  
Statistics Oil Production Oil Price 
Mean  83.31 64.64 
Median 75.36 62.44 
Maximum 141.86 136.03 
Minimum 44.36 17.53 
Std. Dev. 21.39 33.36 
Skewness 0.62 0.21 
Kurtosis 2.32 1.63 
Jarque Bera 14.69 15.01 
Obs 176 176 
Correlation 87.30% 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 
4. Presentation and discussion of results 
 
The analysis is presented in two sections: (1) a form of trend analysis is used to identify the pattern the crude 
oil production took over time and highlights its responses to oil price shocks; and (2)  the effective crude oil price and 
production benchmark for the short, medium and long terms is estimated. 
 
4.1 Trend analysis and pattern recognition 
 
Figure 1 presents the trends of crude oil price and production between January 2000 and September 2014. It is 
apparent that the production-price relationship is positive – in line with microeconomic theory on price and supply. 
Therefore, the proposed decrease in the oil production volume in the benchmark of the MTEF / FSP report for 2015, 
compared to 2014,is permeable – while projecting an oil price rise from US$77.50 in 2014 to an initial US$78.00 
gives two crucial implications. First, US$78 is over-ambitious and second, it shows threats from excess supply in the 
international market. The latest revision of the oil price benchmark to US$65 is still over ambitious due to the 
continuous decline in the oil price on the international market – to US$59 per barrel in December 2014. This prompted 
this research.  
The contribution of Nigeria’s crude oil production to the OPEC production basket is represented in figure 2. 
The trend in the charts shows that Nigeria’s crude oil supply reaction to price changes was positive on average, and 
thus influenced the contribution to OPEC supply in the past. In other words, during the boom period (marked circle 
one in figure 1), precisely in mid- 2008 when the crude oil price rose and hovered around US$121 toUS$136, the 
monthly crude oil supply increased and remained around 138 million barrels and 141 million barrels respectively. 
However, in the previous recession (marked circle two in figure 1), specifically 2008 crisis, Nigeria’s crude oil 
production declined as the free-fall in oil price lasted for about 180 days (6 months).  In figure 3 below, the pattern of 
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oil production during the preceding oil price decrease is identified. It was noted that oil production exhibits a positive 
reaction to a price fall.  
Two critical points were identified to behave awkwardly. Point A shows the elastic relationship between oil 
production and price. This implies that oil production fell excessively due to a slight decline in the oil price. Point B, 
on the other hand, showed a complementary relationship between oil production and price. This reaction was trivial 
with a lesser response from oil production (output increase by 0.45%). During this period, the price decline was noted 
to be short lived and the response to production was trifling. With the above analyses, we recognised that the pattern 
of oil production during the period of price decline was a significant fall. Hence, there was a cut in supply as the price 
slumped.   
 
 
Fig. 1. Trends of Nigeria’s crude oil production and price (Jan. 2000 – Sept. 2014) 
Source: Graphed by authors 
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Fig. 2. Nigeria’s crude oil production contribution to OPEC basket (in %) 
Source: Graphed by authors 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Identifying crude oil production pattern 
Source: Graphed by authors 
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4.2 Volatility model and analysis 
 
Having established a positive relationship between crude oil production and price using trend analysis, there is 
need to estimate the volatility. Volatility gives the swings in oil price and volume, and the result is standardised to 
incorporate the short, medium and long-term projections. From the GARCH (1, 1) model result (see Appendix 1), 
long-term variance, volatility  iV  and the standardised volatility  iSV values are generated.  These values are 
estimated from the coefficients in the variance model in Appendix 1, the formula for generating the variance and 
volatilities is expressed below, while the standardised volatility is calculated by dividing the volatility by the square 
root of N. 
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From equations (1) and (2), the variance and volatility values for production are 37.283 and 6.785, while those 
for crude oil price are 62.040 and 7.876. The standardised volatilities for the short, medium and long-term, for price, 
are 8.860, 6.264 and 5.115, and production values are 1.114, 0.643 and 0.455, respectively. 
 
4.3 Estimating crude oil price and production range that maximises the nation’s interest 
 
Here, the plausible approach for measuring crude oil price and production range is the confidence interval – 
which is based on the 95% confidence level. X is the official oil price and production benchmark stated in the 
MTEF/FSP paper for 2015.The mathematical representation of the interval is in equation (3) and (4), while the oil 
production benchmark for 2015 is adopted for the confidence interval variable, and the international crude oil price 
for Brent at 31st December 2014 is used for the crude oil price. Hence, X for the crude oil production is 2.27 mb/d and 
X for the crude oil price is $50. 
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With the trend analyses, it is noted that the reaction was a positive relationship between price and quantity. In 
other words, production is revised downward as price declines. Therefore, the lower endpoint of the interval in 
equations (3) and (4) is desirable for price and production. Equation (5) is the lower end point formula. However, the 
upper endpoint is desirable when the price continues to slide and oil-producing countries have the desire to benefit 
from the declining price by raising the production limit.     
  5                                       96.1int 2015 iSXendpoLower V  
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We generated the lower endpoints for the periods using equation (5). The results were that in the short term, 
the MTEF/FSP crude oil production benchmark could range from 0.944 MB/d to 3.611MB/d, while the crude oil price 
could varybetweenUS$32.64 and US$67.36 per barrel. This suggests that in the next 30 days, if OPEC should embark 
in a cut in crude oil production to drain excess supply from the market, then Nigeria can revise the benchmark of oil-
production volume downward in response to falling prices. However, it should not slash the benchmark below 0.944 
million barrels per day. On the other hand, they could raise the benchmark to 3.611 mb/d to benefit from the declining 
crude oil price by increasing oil revenue. The crude oil price segment of the market could have its price decline to the 
tune of US$32 per barrel, and may rebound to as high of US$67 per barrel. 
In the medium term – specifically 90 days – if the price continues to decline, accompanied by OPEC moving 
for reduction in oil production – then the MTEF/FSP benchmark on oil production volume could vary from 1.016 to 
3.539mb/d. Amidst the increased volatility in the crude oil price, sixty (60) days was used in the analysis for the 
medium-term analysis. It is shown that in the medium-term, the crude oil price (Brent) could slide by US$12.2 from 
US$59. 22 at the end of December 2014 – to settle at US$37.72 per barrel and could also rise to US$62.2 in the 
medium term. 
For the long term – six months – the results indicate that the MTEF/FSP benchmark should be allowed to range 
between1.386 mb/d and 3.170mb/d. This implies the minimum oil production benchmark if the declining price persists 
and more so with OPEC adopting a cut in production to salvage excess supply. The crude oil price (Brent) in the next 
90 days (representing long-term interval) will range between US$40 and US$60.The benchmark of oil production 
volume for the short, medium and long terms should not be lower than 0.944 mb/d, 1.016 mb/d and 1.386 mb/d – and 
must not be greater than 2.2782 mb/d. However, if the aim is to stimulate market demand through a price rebate, then 
we can embrace the maximum limit to increase market share, whereas the crude oil price will be US$32.6, US$38 and 
US$40 per barrel for the period of one, two and three months, respectively. The results are summarised in Tables 2 
and 3 below. 
 
Table 2: Summary of results   
Period Standardized Volatility Minimum Benchmark Increase Market Share 
Short term 1.114 0.944 mb/d 3.611 mb/d 
Medium term 0.643 1.016 mb/d 3.539 mb/d 
Long term 0.451 1.386 mb/d 3.170 mb/d 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 
Table 3: Summary of results   
Period Standardized Volatility Lower Endpoints Upper Endpoints 
Short term 8.860 $32.6per barrel $67.3 per barrel 
Medium term 6.264 $37.7 per barrel $62.2per barrel 
Long term 5.115 $40per barrel $60per barrel 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 
4.4 Robustness test 
 
We test for robustness of results using a small sample size – specifically 31 months. This follows rational 
expectation, that is, immediate information on an event or series contains more information for recent and future 
assessments. For this reason, we deem it necessary to re-estimate the minimum benchmark or oil production range 
and crude oil price (Brent) adopting 31months and then compare the result with the previous estimates. Therefore, we 
re-estimate the volatility test through the GARCH (1,1) model (see Appendix 2 for the result) and employ the adjusted 
confidence interval approach to generate the range of both price and production – bearing in mind the short, medium 
and long-term, respectively.   
581 Saidi Atanda Mustapha and Luqman Adedamola Sulaiman /  Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  573 – 585 
 
We estimated the long-term variance, volatility and standardised volatility from the GARCH (1,1) to be 11.253, 
3.354 and 0.612 for short term, 0.353 for medium term and 0.251 for long-term. For the crude oil price, the long term 
variance is 18.629, 4.316 and 7.107 for short term, 5.025 for medium term, and 4.103 for long term.   
Following the previous procedure, we generated the short-term oil production range to be 1.078 mb/d and 3.477 
mb/d – while the medium-term range is 1.586 mb/d and 2.970 mb/d. The long-term estimates for the minimum and 
maximum benchmarks are 1.786 mb/d and 2.770 mb/d. Compared to the small sample size, the minimum benchmark 
estimates for the large sample consider extreme volatilities that can emanate from future slower market demands. The 
maximum end points show the opportunity available for the country to take advantage of the falling oil price to raise 
market share and to enhance oil revenue. A cross-examination of the two estimations shows that the large sample 
estimates give the country increased market share, with higher maximum end points for each term – assuming OPEC 
advocates for more market share through an increase in the production ceiling. All-in-all, we deduced that controlling 
for sample size does not significantly influence or make the result better off than the previous estimations. However, 
the results obtained from the small sample have been able to showcase smaller variation in all the terms – while both 
estimations stress that volatility in oil production series dies off as the time path increases. In other words, as time 
increases, standardised volatility declines. Both results could establish that oil production volatility exhibits mean 
reversion with a long memory. This suggests that there are chances of increasing the minimum production benchmark 
in the future, as oil production volatility remains neutral during this period.    
The crude oil price effect also settles around US$40, which makes the two estimations not significantly different 
from each other. Therefore, our estimations were not biased by sample size. It is acknowledged that the short-term 
has a price ranges ofUS$36.07 per barrel to $63.92 per barrel. The medium-term recorded that crude oil price hovers 
around US$40.15 to US$59.85 per barrel, while the next 90 days could realise a minimum crude oil price (Brent) price 
of US$41.95 and a rebound price of US$58.04 per barrel. Intuitively, the results indicate that the crude oil price would 
decline to around US$40 per barrel for the next 90days. Thus, Nigeria should plan her economic activities for 2015 
with these minimum crude oil price benchmarks – which will driftbetweenUS$37 and US$41.95 per barrel. 
 
4.5 Challenges of slower revenue as a result of declining crude oil prices 
From the findings, the following challenges were noted and highlighted: 
x The recurrent Nigerian expenditure of Nigeria has been moving upwards, such that in the proposed 
budget of 2015 it was N3, 970. 84 billion – which was greater than the retained revenue which stood at 
N3, 602.96 billion. This indicates that the retained revenue available for the 2015 budget could not 
finance recurrent expenditure without increasing the fiscal deficit.  
x The proposed Gross Federally Collected Revenue may be too ambitious. The reason is that the revenue 
purse depends on the revenue coming from oil and owing to the findings of this report and conundrums 
surrounding the sector – this inflow may not be sizeable this year.   
x The poor collection rate of the Non-Oil revenue over the years is a crucial challenge to the proposed 
revenue in the 2015 budget. However, it is noteworthy that the Federal Government has empowered the 
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and McKinsey to improve their tax net – but there is need a to 
intensify the effort to actualise the increased projection.   
x Issues on external reserves and trade that could influence exchange rates and consequently total oil 
revenue were not properly addressed in Nigeria’s revenue framework.  
 
5. Summary, conclusion and recommendations 
 
5.1 Summary and conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to estimate the production range and minimum benchmark to set for oil production 
in the MTEF/FSP report for the budget, even if OPEC decides to embrace a cut in production in the face of a free-fall 
in the oil price – and estimating the crude oil price (Brent) optimal bound. Following trend analysis, pattern recognition 
(known trend), and GARCH modelling and interval adjustment, it was found that in the presence of the prevailing 
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circumstances – a persistent fall in international prices and OPEC’s reaction the crude oil production benchmark can 
be revised downward. However, it must not fall below the minimum benchmarks in tables 3 and 5. The downward 
revision must take note of the volatility of the series and be re-standardised with the appropriate number of days. We 
concede that less is done regarding crude oil supply, but the nature of the market is oligopoly. Hence, a cut in oil 
production may be inevitable in this period of excess supply in order to recover from price declines. However, Nigeria 
can also benefit from a price slash as their Saudi Arabian counterpart has done recently by earning more market share 
through price rebates. In this case, the country will need to increase production using the estimates from the upper 
endpoints. This will drive the maximum oil production possible (assuming a weak form of efficiency operates in the 
oil market). 
Empirical examination of the crude oil price (Brent) reveals that amongst rising volatility and uncertainty, the 
price will linger around US$40 per barrel for the next 90 days. Therefore, Nigerian governments, government agencies 
such as ministries, the Central Bank of Nigeria, DMO, financial market dealers, capital market operators, private 
establishments and others affected – should bear in mind that the crude oil price will hover around US$40 per barrel. 
This information should be incorporated in their activities to minimise the risk and uncertainty associated with their 
investment as a result of the crude oil price free-fall and its embedded volatility.   
 
5.2 Policy recommendations  
The federal government and Ministry of Finance have invested considerable efforts into improving the revenue 
base with the introduction of a Tax Identification Number (TIN) that will reduce avoidance, evasion and thus enhance 
tax coverage. The closure of MDA’s revenue account and the treasury single account (TSA) with the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), is coupled with the efficiency in the management of payroll through the Innovative Payroll and 
Personnel Solutions (IPPS). The recent belt-tightening measures such as paying tax on luxury goods, reducing public 
expenditure and international travel by public servants, and increasing non-oil revenue as the collection target for the 
FIRS – was revised upwards from N65 billion in 2014 to N160 billion in 2015. These are all good arrangements that 
will doubtless lessen wasteful spending, increase revenue, and consequently enhance sustainable growth as contained 
in the transformation agenda for the 2011-2015 period and the 2015-17 MTEF/FSP report. However, as we move to 
the full moon of the reality, the following are recommended for immediate action in order to improve the revenue 
base in 2015. 
x The Value Added Tax (VAT) rates of 5% should be retained, but increasing the tax base remains necessary. 
For comprehensive tax coverage, the exemption list in VAT may require review –  that is, the government 
should increase the scope of VAT items.     
x The government should review the inherent discrepancies in tax policies and significantly reduce the 
informality of the informal sector of the economy as we trail along the developmental programmes 
highlighted for 2015.  
x The Federal Government should identify the economic viability of available natural resources in the states 
and should allow each state with peculiar natural resources to embark on development and exploitation of 
these resources – while extraction and the property still remain with the federal government.  The tax from 
the investment will increase the tax coverage, and proposed revenue expected from solid minerals that have 
been slated at N15.68 billion for 2015, may be higher.  
x Efforts must be intensified to curtail crude oil theft. This is necessary to actualize the crude oil production of 
2.27 million barrel a day proposed in the 2015 revenue framework. Illegal refineries and pipelines – 
especially those in the Niger Delta and Lagos require thorough investigation in this period. 
x The issue of trade mispricing should be carefully checked to reduce revenue leakages. Firms – in an attempt 
to avoid tax remittance to the government – try to underestimate the value of exports and increase the amount 
quoted on their importation. Customs should validate the landing cost of inputs and other importation made 
by companies – to reduce the amount of revenue firms recouped through this medium. 
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After the immediate recommended actions, the following points may be considered for implementation in 
succeeding periods: 
x There is a need to have a detailed revenue framework with sub-items – in the expenditure framework – and 
each of the revenue sub-items must have projections.  
x An Act should mandate agencies to remit some percentage of their operating surplus and should probably 
also regulate agencies to channel their project fund through the government. 
x The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) should audit the account of companies that report loss for two 
or three years consecutively. Most firms manipulate their financial statement to declare loss at the end of the 
fiscal year to evade payment of tax. Therefore, FIRS should, by no means, allow any company to roll losses 
over for more than one year, without a proper audit of their financial statement.   
 
In conclusion, there is a need to reduce the dependency of the state and local governments on the federal 
account. In a situation where the state and the local governments receive 47.32% of the Federation Account and 85% 
of the VAT Pool Account, it is simply an attempt to make these tiers unproductive, and it might be anti-developmental. 
Such an act has consistently impacted on retained revenue in previous years. 
 
 Appendix A: Volatility model  
GARCH (1,1): Jan. 2000 - Nov. 2014 
 Crude Oil Production Crude Oil Price 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
Mean Equation: 
mD  3.832 0.018 0.735 0.019 
mE  0.955 0 0.99 0 
Variance Equation: 
vK  13.049 0.006 1.296 0.086 
vH  0.322 0.05 0.288 0.007 
vZ  0.328 0.134 0.691 0 
Diagnostics 
AIC 6.359 5.946 
SIC 6.45 6.036 
HQC 6.396 5.982 
ARCH LM test 
F-test 0.575 0.001 
n(R-Square) 0.579 0.001 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
 
Appendix B: Volatility model (robustness estimate)  
GARCH (1,1): Jan. 2012 - Nov. 2014 
 Crude Oil Production Crude Oil Price 
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Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
Mean Equation: 
mD  55.429 0 42.539 0 
mE  0.497 0 0.596 0 
Variance Equation: 
vK  0.844 0.103 0.844 0.411 
vH  -0.241 0.101 -0.236 0.248 
vZ  1.166 0 1.191 0 
Diagnostics 
AIC 5.651 5.811 
SIC 5.882 6.038 
HQC 5.727 5.887 
ARCH LM test 
F-test 1.099 0.232 
n(R-Square) 1.133 0.246 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 
References  
 
Barsky, R. B. & Kilian, L., 2004. Oil and the Macro-economy since the 1970s. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 115-134. 
Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M. & Watson, M., 1997. Systematic Monetary Policy and the Effects of Oil Price Shocks. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1, 91-142. 
Bollerslev, T., 1986. Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity. Journal of Econometrics 31, 307-327.  
Brown, S. P. A. & Yucel, M. K., 1999. Oil Prices and U.S. Aggregate Economic Activity: A Question of Neutrality. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic and Financial Review (Second Quarter), 16-23.  
Cunado, J. & de Gracia, F. P., 2003. Do Oil Price Shocks Matter? Evidence for some European Countries. Energy Economics 25, 
137-154. 
Darby, M. R., 1982. The Price of Oil and World Inflation and Recession. American Economic Review 72, 738-751. 
Ekpo, A.H., 2014. Monetary Policy Options for Managing the Emerging Oil Price Shock in Nigeria. A Paper Presented at the 
Policy Dialogue Organised by the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS) and the Nigerian Economic Society 
(NES), 2nd December, 2014, Abuja-Nigeria.    
Gisser, M. & Goodwin T. H., 1986. Crude Oil and the Macro-economy: Tests of Some Popular Notions. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking 18, 95-103. 
Hamilton, J. D., 1983. Oil and the Macro-economy since World War II. Journal of Political Economy 91, 228-248. 
Hamilton, J. D., 1996. This is What Happened to the Oil Price-Macro-economy Relationship. Journal of Monetary Economics 38, 
215-220. 
Hamilton, J. D. & Herrera, A. M., 2001. Oil Shocks and Aggregate Macro-economy Behaviour: the Role of Monetary Policy. 
Discussion Paper 2001-10, University of California, San Diego. 
Hooker, M., 1996. What Happened to the Oil Price-Macro-economy relationship?. Journal of Monetary Economics 38, 195-213. 
Huang, B. N., Hwang, M. J. & Peng, H. P., 2005. The Asymmetry of the Impact of Oil Price Shocks on Economic Activities: an 
Application of the Multivariate Threshold Model. Energy Economics 27, 455-476. 
Huntington, M. G., 2005. ‘The Economic Consequences of Higher Oil Prices. Final Report, EMF SR 9, Stanford University. 
Kilian, L., 2006. The Effects of Exogenous Oil Supply Shocks on Output and Inflation: Evidence from the G7 Countries. Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 5404. 
Lee, K., Ni, S. & Ratti, R. A., 1995. Oil Shocks and the Macro-economy: The Role of Price Volatility. Energy Journal 16, 39-56.  
Mork, K. A., 1989. Oil Shocks and the Macro-economy when Prices Go Up and Down: an Extension of Hamilton’s Results. Journal 
of Political Economy 97,  740-744. 
585 Saidi Atanda Mustapha and Luqman Adedamola Sulaiman /  Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  573 – 585 
 
Mork, K. A., Olsen, O. & Mysen, H. T., 1994. Macro-economic Responses to Oil Price Increases and Decreases in Seven OECD 
Countries. Energy Journal 15, 19-35.   
Obadan, M.I., 2003. National Development Planning and Budgeting in Nigeria: Some Pertinent Issues, Lagos: Broadway Press 
Limited. 
Obadan, M.I., 2014. Fiscal Policy Options for Managing the Emerging Oil Price in Nigeria. A Paper Presented at the Policy 
Dialogue Organised by the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS) and the Nigerian Economic Society (NES), 2nd  
December, 2014, Abuja-Nigeria. 
Salisu, A. A. & Mobolaji, H., 2013. Modelling Returns and Volatility Transmission between Oil Price and U.S.-Nigeria Exchange 
Rate. Energy Economics 39, 169-176.    
Taiwo, O., 2014. Discussion of Professor Mike Obadan’s Presentation on Fiscal Policy Options for Managing the Emerging Oil 
Price in Nigeria. A Paper Presented at the Policy Dialogue Organized by the National Institute for Legislative Studies 
(NILS) and the Nigerian Economic Society (NES), 2nd December, 2014, Abuja-Nigeria.    
 
 
